Attorney Malpractice: Problems Associated with Failure-to-Appeal Cases by White, Justin Stillwell
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 31 Number 2 Article 8 
4-1-1982 
Attorney Malpractice: Problems Associated with Failure-to-Appeal 
Cases 
Justin Stillwell White 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Justin S. White, Attorney Malpractice: Problems Associated with Failure-to-Appeal Cases, 31 Buff. L. Rev. 
583 (1982). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol31/iss2/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH
FAILURE-TO-APPEAL CASES
INTRODUCTION
Legal malpractice, designated a cause of action in contract' or
tort,2 has taken on new dimensions as disappointed clients have
attempted to hold their former attorneys responsible for an in-
creasing 3 variety of acts and omissions.4 Faced with the task of ad-
1. See Miller v. Metzinger, 91 Cal. App. 3d 31, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1979); Boecher v.
Borth, 51 A.D.2d 598, 377 N.Y.S.2d 781 (3d Dep't 1976); Gunn v. Mahoney, 95 Misc. 2d 943,
408 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1978). See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1977);
D. MEmsELAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDuRE (1980); D. STERN, AN ATtoR-
NEY's GUIE TO MALPRACTICE LLBi~mrrv (1977). See also Mallor, Implied Warranties for Le-
gal Services-Tomorrow's Issue?, 6 Omo N.U.L. REv. 651 (1979); Note, Attorney Malprac-
tice: Use of Contract Analysis to Determine the Existence of an Attorney-Client
Relationship, 63 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1979).
As an action in contract, the legal malpractice claim has several distinct elements: (i)
attorney-client relationship, (ii) express or implied agreement that the client will pay a fee
for services rendered, (iii) failure to achieve the contracted-for result, and (iv) damages.
Implicit in any such "contract" is the condition that the attorney will exercise professional
skill and diligence. See R. MALLEN & V. LEWvr, supra, at 104-07, wherein the authors discuss
the amenability of contract analysis to tort theory.
2. See Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal. App. 3d 754, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977); Titsworth v.
Mondo, 95 Misc. 2d 233, 407 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1978), modified, 73 A.D.2d 1049, 45 N.Y.S.2d
422 (1980). See also Haughy, Lawyer's Malpractice: A Comprehensive Appraisal, 48 NOTRE
DAm LAW. 888 (1973); Kasten, Attorney Malpractice in Illinois: An Early Chapter in a
Book Destined for Great Length, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 309 (1980); Probert & Hendricks, Law-
yer Malpractice: Duty Relationships Beyond Contract, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 708 (1980);
Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel - The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HAv. L. REv.
633 (1980); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VANn. L. REv. 755 (1959). See
also Symposium on Legal Malpractice, 6 Omo N.U.L. REv. 649 (1979). See generally An-
not., 90 A.L.R. 3d 293 (1979).
Attorney malpractice as a tort action consists of four basic elements: (i) the duty to use
such skill, prudence, and diligence as would the "reasonable attorney," (ii) breach of duty of
care, (iii) proximate cause between the negligent act or omission and harm to the plaintiff,
and (iv) actual loss or harm to the plaintiff. For a discussion of these elements, see Wade,
supra, at 757-72.
3. Case chronology strongly suggests that attorney malpractice litigation has increased
dramatically over the last twenty years. See Note, Improving Information on Legal Mal-
practice, 82 YALE L.J. 590 (1973). See also Kasten, supra note 2, at 309; Klimet & Wanat,
Legal Malpractice: A Problem in Want of an Answer, 9 MEm. ST. U.L. REV. 193, 193-94
(1979).
4. Several cases stand out as novel and unsuccessful attempts. In Banerian v. O'Malley,
42 Cal. App. 3d 604, 116 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974), the court held that an attorney who defended
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judicating such claims, courts have had to develop rules and legal
doctrines designed to resolve the procedural" and substantive is-
sues presented. Typically, these decisions have emphasized the use
of traditional tort theories,' similar to the analysis used in medical
vendors in a suit by purchasers for recission owed no duty to inform the property insurer of
an impending suit.
In Sherbak v. Doughty, 72 A.D.2d 548, 420 N.Y.S.2d 725 (2d Dep't 1979), that portion of
a malpractice complaint seeking damages for emotional pain and suffering allegedly arising
from the lawyer's mismanagement of the client's case was dismissed as a matter of law.
Accord, Fox v. Issler, 77 A.D.2d 860, 431 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2d Dep't 1980).
Failure to do that which professional duty requires has also been the gravamen of un-
usual, and dismissed, complaints. For example, a California humane society brought an ac-
tion against the attorneys of a decedent who had drawn a will under the latter's directions,
While the will provided for bequests to societies for the protection of animals, plaintiffs
were not beneficiaries. In alleging malpractice, they contended that the defendant lawyers
had a duty to draft the will with such a degree of specificity so as to include them as lega-
tees. Ventura County Humane Soc'y v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1974).
In Vitale v. Coyne Realty, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 562, 414 N.Y.S.2d 388 (4th Dep't 1979), the
defendant attorney represented buyers in the sale of real property, after a contract of sale
had been finalized. Plaintiffs claimed that the lawyer failed to advise them of the feasibility
of their financial investment. The court said, "[a]n attorney has no duty to advise as to the
feasibility of a financial investment after his client has contracted for the purchase." Id. at
567, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (emphasis added).
5. With respect to determining the probable success or failure of any allegedly mishan.
died litigation, a relevant inquiry becomes: "what procedure should the malpractice trial
court follow to conduct its 'suit within a suit'?" See Coggin, Attorney Negligence... A
Suit Within A Suit, 60 W. VA. L. Rav. 225, 234 (1958).
Where the question is whether the attorney has breached an implied or express contract,
or a duty not connected with the conduct of litigation per se, the admission of expert evi-
dence as to the standard of care becomes a lively issue. See Breslin & McMonigle, The Use
of Expert Testimony in Actions Against Attorneys, 43 INs. CouN. J. 119 (1980).
6. Among the many substantive issues present in attorney malpractice, several stand
out, such as whether deviation from any standard of professional conduct is a question of
law or of fact (see Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 776-81
(1968)) and whether specialization should be recognized as a basis for holding attorneys to a
higher standard of care. See Schnidman, The Collateral Effects of Legal Specialization on
the Applicable Standard of Care as it Relates to the Duty to Consult and to Advise, 6
Omo N.U.L. Rav. 666 (1979).
7. Whether the action is characterized as one in tort or contract may have significant
consequences with respect to the statute of limitations for malpractice claims. Generally, the
period of limitation is shorter for an action in negligence than for one in contract. The New
York malpractice statute of limitations, for example, is three years (see N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW
§ 214 (McKinney 1982)), whereas the time for filing contract complaints is six years. See
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1982). See Central Trust Co. v. Goldman, 70 A.D.2d
767, 417 N.Y.S.2d 359 (4th Dep't 1979) (attorney malpractice action characterized as sound-
ing in contract because harm was caused by fraud of attorney). But see Johnson v. Gold, 71
A.D.2d 1056, 420 N.Y.S.2d 816 (4th Dep't 1979) (malpractice action involving negligence
came within the purview of malpractice statute of limitations). See also CAL. CIV. Poo.
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malpractice actions.8 Legal malpractice litigation,9 however, has oc-
casioned the growth of distinct hybrid legal concepts 0 which at-
tempt to deal with complex questions of negligence in the context
of the legal profession.
One of the more difficult questions involved in a legal mal-
practice action concerns causation. After a plaintiff shows that a
duty has been breached by the attorney, he must demonstrate that
"but for" such negligence, he would have obtained a more
favorable result." In cases where the negligence alleged involves
the mishandling of a trial or a procedural misstep taken while per-
forming routine legal services, the plaintiff's burden of persuasion
is relatively simple. The trial court hearing the malpractice claim
merely retries, or tries for the first time, 2 the plaintiff's cause of
action which he asserts was lost or compromised by his attorney's
negligence, and then decides whether the plaintiff would have
fared substantially better "but for" such mishandling. 8
CODE § 340.6 (West 1954) (malpractice statute of limitations); Note, Attorney Malpractice
- The Accrual of A Cause of Action, 42 TENN. L. Rav. 784 (1975); Note, The Commence-
ment of the Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Actions - The Need for Reevalu-
ation: Eckert v. Schaal, 15 UCLA L. Rav. 230 (1967).
8. For some comparisons of medical malpractice litigation with its legal counterpart,
see Schnidman & Saizler, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will New Standards of Care
Place Professional Liability Insurance Beyond the Reach of the Specialist?, 45 U. Cnq. L.
Rnv. 541, 550-53 (1976); Note, supra note 7.
9. This Comment concerns civil legal malpractice as distinguished from criminal mal-
practice. While the latter raises significant and provocative issues (see, e.g., People v. Sal-
querro, 73 A.D.2d 56, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dep't 1980) (discussion of attorney's duty to
make court record of client's perjury committed against the former's advice)), it is beyond
the scope of this work. For a brief treatment of the subject, see Kaus & Mallen, The Mis-
guiding Hand of Counsel - Reflections on "Criminal Malpractice", 21 UCLA L. Rav. 1191
(1974).
10. For example, the lawyer's duty to his or her client, the "reasonable attorney," "legal
incompetence," "good faith judgment," and "attorney malpractice." They are derived, in
part, from principles of tort law developed and applied in the context of medical malprac-
tice. As the word "malpractice" suggests, negligence of lawyers has been termed a "derelic-
tion from professional duty." See WEBsTzR's SEvENr NEw COLEGIATz DIcTIoNARY 512
(1970). Concepts such as "reasonable attorney" may be viewed as simply the result of trans-
forming the "reasonable man" of torts into a lawyer.
11. This principle was first enunciated 100 years ago in Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881). The court in Spangler stated, "[t]o entitle the plaintiff to recover for
negligence he must not only show the negligence, but he must also show that damage re-
sulted to him from such negligence. ... ." Id. at 894-95. See also Titsworth v. Mondo, 95
Misc. 2d 233, 243, 407 N.Y.S.2d 793, 798 (1978) ("[P]laintiff must establish ... that he
would have succeeded in the first action but for his attorney's malpractice.").
12. See generally Coggin, supra note 5.
13. See, e.g., Cline v. Watkins, 66 Cal. App. 3d 174, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1977); Carpen-
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In cases involving an attorney's alleged failure to perfect an
appeal, however, the burden of proving causation can be far more
difficult. The main inquiry becomes whether the frustrated client
would have been successful on appeal,14 "but for" his or her attor-
ney's negligence. 15 Thus, not only must the court determine what
should have happened at trial, but, in addition, how a higher court
would have ruled on appeal.
This Comment examines legal malpractice law in failure-to-
appeal cases. Such cases are significant because of the novel issues
of fact and law presented as well as the conflicting results reached
by the various courts. The main emphasis involves a discussion of
the plaintiff's burden of proof. Special effort has been made to an-
alyze the types of evidence and methods of proof courts have con-
sidered in determining whether a disappointed client would have
fared substantially better on appeal. In addition, a critique of sev-
eral solutions advanced in response to the "attorney malpractice
dilemma" will be made, together with a proposal for a more ra-
tional and workable standard to be employed by courts in adjudi-
cating such claims.
I. THE PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Elements of Attorney Malpractice Tort
A typical failure-to-appeal case involves inadvertent error; for
example, where a lawyer neglects to take an appeal within the pe-
ter v. Weichert, 51 A.D.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 191 (3d Dep't 1976).
14. See, e.g., Pusey v. Reed, 258 A.2d 460 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) where the court re-
marked, "[ifn accordance with this general rule [that the plaintiff must prove negligence
resulted in harm], where the negligence relied upon is a failure to take an appeal, it must be
shown that, if an appeal had been taken, a more favorable result would have been reached."
Id. at 461.
15. In the context of attorney malpractice litigation, the concept of causation is usually
defined as "strict" proximate cause, i.e., the "but for" variety which requires judge and jury
to single out the lawyer's negligence as the sole basis for the client's loss. See, e.g., Reynolds
v. Picciano, 29 A.D.2d 1012, 1012, 289 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (3d Dep't 1969) (plaintiff must
prove at trial that "but for the negligence of the attorney, the plaintiff's claim would or
could have been collected"). See also Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court, 92
Cal. App. 3d 934, 943, 155 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399 (1979) ("[b]efore a client can recover for
alleged negligence ... he must establish that any loss suffered was caused solely by the
negligence of the attorney"). But see Modica v. Crist, 129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 276 P.2d 614
(1954); Comment, Legal Malpractice, 27 ARK. L. REv. 452, 462 (1973) (it would be inequita-




riod prescribed by statute.16 In Pete v. Henderson, the plaintiff
sued his father's former attorney for failing to file a timely notice
of appeal, thus losing the opportunity to have an adverse judgment
reversed. The malpractice case was dismissed on the basis that no
cause of action had been stated."8 On appeal, the California Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed, stating:
In the present case, the attorney was negligent in failing to file the notice of
appeal. That is admitted. The question is, what damages were proximately
caused by that negligence? Obviously, the $150 fee paid to the attorney to
take the appeal was a proper item of damage. This was allowed and is not in
question on this appeal. But that is not the only item of damage that appel-
lant may have suffered. If the judgment against him for $1600 was erroneous,
to the extent it would have been reversed on appeal under circumstances that
would not require him to pay it, he has suffered serious damage indeed. That
damage was directly and proximately caused by the negligence of the attor-
ney. If proof of the required state of facts can be made, appellant should be
able to recover the damage so suffered. 9
In cases such as Pete the facts generally reveal the existence of
an attorney-client relationship 20 and a breach of the lawyer's duty
of care.21 It is the latter two elements of the attorney malpractice
16. See, e.g., Welder v. Mercer, 247 Ark. 499, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970).
17. 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954).
18. In Pete, the trial court ruled "not only that there was a failure of proof, but that, as
a matter of law, no other damages than the attorney's fees could be recovered." Id. at 488,
269 P.2d at 79.
19. Id. at 488-89, 269 P.2d at 79.
20. A threshold question in this context is whether an attorney's agreement to re-
present a client includes the implied agreement to proffer an appeal from any adverse judg-
ment. If a lawyer explicitly agrees to represent the client in the event an appeal becomes
necessary, then such a contract would undoubtedly provide the basis for recovery. "[T]he
terms of the retainer agreement would govern the procedure that an attorney should fol-
low." D. MmSELMAN, supra note 1, at 253. See also Franke v. Zimmerman, 526 S.W.2d 257,
258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (contract of employment between attorney and client normally
terminates upon rendering of final judgment).
Insofar as any implied warranty to appeal is concerned, it has been held that an attorney
is not obligated to proffer an appeal absent an express agreement to do so. See, e.g., Lund-
berg v. Backman, 11 Utah 2d 330, 358 P.2d 987 (1961); Hey v. Simon, 29 Ky. 315, 93 S.W.
50 (1906). But see Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968) (trial counsel
must inform client of right to appeal).
21. A relevant issue concerning the attorney's duty in appellate practice is the standard
of care applicable to such duty. Is the appellate litigation attorney a "specialist" who must
be held to a higher standard of care than the "average attorney?" Or, does the widespread
reluctance to recognize specialties insulate lawyers who "specialize" in appellate practice?
See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 785-86 ("the courts have been unwilling to recognize the
legal specialist").
One could argue that any standard of care applied to lawyers is more the result of im-
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tort, proximate cause and damages, which present complex issues
for courts to decide. While these two elements may present no
great challenge when the question before the court is whether the
contracted-for result was achieved 22 or whether the property of the
plaintiff was lost,23 the failure-to-appeal case is unique by virtue of
the demands it makes upon a court to determine what would have
happened if the attorney had acted diligently.
Cases involving contracts to perform non-litigation duties do
not require the malpractice trial court to speculate about what
would have occurred at trial,24 so the court can often rely either
upon the agreement between the parties or upon the settled law of
the jurisdiction. Even in cases where the alleged negligence con-
cerns the failure to commence" or pursue26 litigation, the court
merely commences a suit within a suit to determine what the out-
come of litigation would have been.27 In the failure-to-appeal cases,
however, the court hearing the malpractice claim must in addition
determine what decision would have been reached by an appellate
plied warranties than of specialization. In other words, an attorney's agreement to under-
take work for his or her client (in this context, proffer an appeal) necessarily implies that he
or she possesses the requisite skill to do so. At the very least, such an agreement assumes
that the counselor knows what the procedure is or will ascertain what it is. Insofar as some
degree of specialization is called for in all types of legal services, every attorney is a de facto
specialist. See Childs v. Comstock, 69 A.D. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902) (New York court rec-
ognized customs brokerage lawyer as de facto specialist).
22. See, e.g., Bernard v. Walkup, 272 Cal. App. 2d 595, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969); Lind-
ner v. Eichel, 34 Misc. 2d 840, 232 N.Y.S.2d 240, aff'd mem., 17 A.D.2d 735, 233 N.Y.S.2d
238 (1st Dep't 1962).
23. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Vitale v. Coyne Realty, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 562, 414 N.Y.S.2d
388 (1979).
24. For example, in the oft-cited case of Lucas v. Hanem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685,
15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962), the malpractice trial court was
asked to decide whether the lawyer's failure to properly employ the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities constituted negligence, and if so, whether the would-be beneficiaries suffered any actual
loss. The Supreme Court of California ruled that although the plaintiffs were in privity with
the testator and his lawyer, their suit for malpractice could not succeed because "[a]n attor-
ney of ordinary skill acting under the same circumstances might have fallen into the net
which the Rule spreads for the unwary." Id. at 593, 364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826
(citations omitted). This result has been severely criticized. See Note, Attorney's Violation
of Future Interests Statute Held Not Actionable, 14 STAN. L. REV. 580 (1962).
25. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Farber, 46 A.D.2d 733, 361 N.Y.S.2d 99 (4th Dep't 1974);
Reynolds v. Picciano, 29 A.D.2d 1012, 298 N.Y.S.2d 436 (3d Dep't 1968).
26. See, e.g., Kessler v. Gray, 77 Cal. App. 3d 284, 143 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1978); Budd v.
Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
27. See Coggin, supra note 5.
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court. This added variable makes the plaintiff's burden of proving
proximate cause and damages much more difficult than in the sim-
ple attorney malpractice suit.
B. Additional Elements Required For Failure-to-Appeal Cases
The fact that the malpractice court in a failure-to-appeal case
must determine how an appellate court would have decided the
underlying action requires the plaintiff to prove certain elements
in order to show proximate cause. Specifically, the plaintiff must
show that an appellate court would have had jurisdiction to hear
the appeal, that the appellate court would have granted review
when review is discretionary, and that the trial court's judgment
would have been modified on review. Although damages must be
pleaded in any attorney malpractice suit, this section discusses the
problems of proving damages in failure-to-appeal cases.
1. Jurisdiction. The plaintiff must prove that an appellate
court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.2 The very foundation of
the failure-to-appeal cases rests upon the theory that there was in
fact a court to which the attorney could have proffered an appeal.2 9
Whether an appellate court would have had jurisdiction depends
upon the statutes defining jurisdiction and the applicable federal
or state court procedures.
2. Appellate court would have granted review. In some cases
the underlying action would have been justiciable only if the ap-
28. While this allegation is an essential element of the malpractice complaint, a subtle
question remains as to whether the malpractice plaintiff must plead (i) that appeals to other
tribunals are altogether barred (e.g., both state and federal courts are presently inaccessible
to the plaintiff who would have appealed an adverse administrative decision to either court);
or (ii) that the plaintiff applied for and was denied leave to appeal under a statute which
permitted late appeals, such as MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 28 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1960),
cited in Note, Attorney's Negligence: The Belated Appeal, 2 VAL. U.L. REv. 141, 153 n.78
(1967) [hereinafter cited as The Belated Appeal].
Although the first proposition might be "apparent on the face" of the lower court's re-
cord, it is not clear that requesting remission from the tolling of a statute of limitations
plays a critical role in the assessment of the plaintiff's cause of action. Should the plaintiff
be required to exhaust such remedies before proceeding against his or her attorney? This
commentator suggests that he or she should be required to take such steps, where permit-
ted, and if successful in lifting the procedural impediment, thereafter hold the former attor-
ney liable for expenses incidental to procuring such a remedy.
29. This Comment concerns lost appeals, as distinguished from motions for a retrial,




pellate court in its discretion granted review. 0 The plaintiff then
has the burden of proving the appeals court would have enter-
tained his request for review. In Better Homes, Inc. v. Rogers,31
the plaintiff company brought a malpractice action against its for-
mer attorney for negligence in connection with the filing of an ap-
peal. Better Homes alleged that Rogers had represented the com-
pany in an action for damages, and after losing in the trial court,
agreed to proffer an appeal. Because an application for a writ of
error was not made within the prescribed time period, however,
and because the appellate brief Rogers filed contained no memo-
randum of law, the petition for review was dismissed. In alleging
malpractice, Better Homes pleaded that but for this negligent han-
dling of the case, the adverse judgment of the trial court would
have been reversed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, and Better Homes would have been relieved of the obliga-
tion of paying the original judgment entered against it.
2
The defendants argued that the appellate court to which Bet-
ter Homes - through its attorney Rogers - would have proffered
its appeal had denied over two-thirds of all applications for ap-
peals and writs of error.33 Thus, while the defendants did not ques-
tion the fact that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the
appeal, they did contend that the chances of that particular court
granting review to the Better Homes' appeal were no better than
one-in-three and, therefore, the judge hearing the malpractice
claim should dismiss the complaint as a matter of law. They ar-
gued "[tihat, since appellate review in West Virginia is not a mat-
ter of right, [the plaintiffs would have to prove that] the Supreme
Court of Appeals would have included the Hill v. Better Homes
case among the minority of cases in which review was granted.
3 4
In deciding the Better Homes case, the trial court questioned
the propriety of sitting "in lieu of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, to pass upon. . . the ruling of the trial court, whose
30. A good example of discretionary review is the United States Supreme Court's pro-
cedure of granting or denying writs of certiorari. See Procedure in Connection with Peti-
tions for Certiorari, in R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 160-223 (4th ed.
1969).
31. 195 F. Supp. 93 (D.W. Va. 1961).
32. Better Homes was found liable for approximately $13,500. Id.




judicial powers are at least coordinate with mine."3 5 However, the
trial court was also concerned that "no lawyer [should] be held
financially responsible for admitted negligence in failing to perfect
an appeal"3 6 if the case would have been dismissed. Therefore, the
judge undertook the "repugnant" task of deciding whether the
"judgment against [Better Homes] would have been reversed
under circumstances which would have required a directed verdict
in its favor upon retrial or the entry of judgment in its favor as a
matter of law."
3 7
In agreeing to decide the malpractice case and to speculate
upon the probability of exercise of jurisdiction by the appeals
court, the trial judge clearly refused to accept the defendants' con-
tention that the case would not have been reviewed. This decision
was in the nature of a concession to the plaintiff by the trial court,
which recognized that it was determining that "the case was of suf-
ficient public importance or that the possibility of error was suf-
ficently apparent to make appellate review imperative. 3 8 The ba-
sis for this ruling was in part the existence of the "repugnant
alternative" of making lawyers judgment-proof from such negli-
gence claims and the court's decision "that the 'speculative nature'
of the damages is no defense to a negligent lawyer whose client has
lost the opportunity to have his claim adjudicated by a court and
jury. .... M9
3. Lower court judgment would have been modified on re-
view. Once the plaintiff in the malpractice action has shown that
an appellate court would have entertained an appeal from the
lower court decision, then the plaintiff must prove that the adverse
35. Id. at 95. A singular difficulty in this respect pertains to the possibility of a rehear-
ing of the underlying action, in the context of the malpractice claim, by the same judge who
tried it in the first instance. Undoubtedly, such a judge would decline to try the malpractice
claim and would request that the case be reassigned.
The same reticence to perform the appellate court's role can be found in Pete v. Hender-
son, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954). In reversing the trial judge's decision not to
weigh the merits of a negligently-handled appeal, the court in Pete found strong policy rea-
sons for deciding the reviewability and likelihood of success on appeal. See also Cornelissen
v. Ort, 132 Mich. 294, 93 N.W. 617 (1903). But see Laux v. Woodworth, 195 Wash. 550, 81
P.2d 531 (1938); Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Cal. App. 677, 283 P. 871 (1929); Childs v. Coin-
stock, 69 A.D. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1st Dep't 1902).
36. Better Homes, 195 F. Supp. at 96.
37. Id. at 97.
38. Id. at 95.
39. Id. at 96.
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judgment would have been reversed or remanded back for further
proceedings. In Better Homes the court framed the issue in these
terms:
That, on submission of the case on review, the court would have reversed the
judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for a new trial;.., and
[tihat, upon a new trial, the verdict and judgment would have been reversed
and entered for the defendant [Better Homes] upon substantially the same
evidence on which the first jury unanimously found for the plaintiff.
40
While not all cases would warrant or permit retrial of the un-
derlying action,41 the allegation that the adverse judgment would
have been modified on review is crucial to the failure-to-appeal
malpractice complaint.42 Without it, a cause of action in appeal
malpractice may be dismissed. In Laux v. Woodworth,5 the court
dismissed that portion of the complaint which alleged that "by
reason of the negligence of the respondent [attorney], she [the
plaintiff] was prevented from having the merits of the litigation
reviewed," stating:
There is no charge that, had a statement of facts been filed in time and been
available for consideration by this court, the appellant could, or would, have
obtained a result on that appeal more favorable to her than she did, which
was affirmance of the judgment. Without such an allegation, the second cause
of action was defective, and the demurrer was properly sustained."
In Pete v. Henderson,5 however, the court ruled that the
plaintiff's failure to "plead and prove that the appeal, had it been
taken, would have resulted in reversal," was not fatal to his cause
of action. The court based its determination on the grounds that
the malpractice plaintiff appeared pro se (having failed to find an
attorney willing to bring suit against a fellow member of the bar)
and the lower court, in refusing to point to defects in the plaintiff's
self-prepared pleadings, overlooked the purpose of a motion for a
40. Id. at 94.
41. Whether a retrial would be necessary would depend upon the discretion of the ap-
pellate court and the procedural posture of the case. If the case had been dismissed below,
then the question of retrial would not arise.
42. See, e.g., Chicago Red Top Cab Ass'n v. Gaines, 49 Ill. App. 3d 332, 333, 364 N.E.2d
328, 329 (1977) ("[Blurden is on the plaintiff to establish that it would have been successful
in the prosecution of the appeal to the circuit court."); Pusey v. Reed, 258 A.2d 460 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1969) ("[I]t must be shown that, if an appeal were taken, a more favorable result
would have been reached.").
43. 195 Wash. 550, 81 P.2d 531 (1938).
44. Id. at 552, 81 P.2d at 532.





Similarly, the plaintiff's failure to show that the underlying ac-
tion would have been reversed was excused by the Fifth Circuit in
Smoot v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. 47 Reversing summary
judgment entered by the district court, the court of appeals held
for the plaintiff. Its decision was based on the facts that the allega-
tion of failure-to-appeal was made to substantiate substandard
performance and bad faith representation by an insurance com-
pany appointed counsel and that the appeal in fact would not have
been made, but the threat to do so would have been employed to
encourage a post-judgment settlement.48 From both Pete and
Smoot, it is clear that the pleadings in failure-to-appeal cases
should contain an allegation that the underlying action would have
been modified by an appeals court, because not doing so will be
excused only under unusual circumstances.
The burden of proving that the plaintiff would have fared sub-
stantially better on appeal is sometimes onerous. For example,
when the area of law affecting the client's case is unsettled, the
claim that an appellate court would have interpreted the law in a
given fashion becomes tenuous. In Collins v. Wanner,49 the Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma was called upon to decide whether the
defendant attorney failed to proffer a meritorious appeal. In
describing the nature of the underlying action, the court said,
"[m]oreover, the issue presented in Wanner v. Wanner [the under-
lying action] has never been directly passed upon by this court and
the answer thereto was in fact highly controversial." 50 The
Oklahoma court refused to hold the lawyer liable, justifying its de-
cision by declaring that "[a]n attorney who acts in good faith.
is not answerable for a mere error of judgment or for a mistake in
point of law which has not been settled by a court of last resort in
this state. . . ."51 While the underlying action in Collins did not
involve issues which were of first impression in the strictest
sense,52 the case illustrates the difficulties such a circumstance
46. Id. at 491, 269 P.2d at 80.
47. 299 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1962).
48. Id. at 532-33.
49. 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963).
50. Id. at 108.
51. Id. at 109.
52. The law affecting the underlying action was in a state of transition, having been
recently modified by decisional law. See id. at 107.
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would create and suggests a possible preview of the manner in
which courts will deal with them.
The disposition of a failure-to-appeal case at the trial level
may also create nearly insurmountable barriers to success in prov-
ing that the plaintiff would have prevailed on appeal. One example
is where the trial court hearing the malpractice claim dismisses the
complaint as a matter of law. In General Accident Fire & Life As-
surance Corp. v. Cosgrove,5" the plaintiff sought to prove in the
trial court that its attorney negligently failed to file an appeal. Af-
ter reviewing the complex facts which constituted the underlying
action,54 the court dismissed the suit and the plaintiff appealed. At
that stage of the proceedings, with the justiciability of the underly-
ing action unresolved, the plaintiff would have to convince an ap-
pellate tribunal that no less than three courts, i.e., the original trial
court, the appellate court which was not reached due to the alleged
negligence, and the malpractice trial court, should have decided
the issue differently. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin re-
marked, "[t]his appears to place a heavy burden on the plaintiff in
this case." '55
4. Damages. In addition to pleading that the original suit
would have been won if appealed, the plaintiff must assert that he
or she suffered actual damages:
Universally it has been held that the mere fact that the plaintiff would have
recovered a judgment in the first action is not sufficient, in and of itself, to
hold the attorney liable. In addition to proof that a judgment would have
been rendered against the former defendant, it is necessary to allege and
prove that he would have been able to respond in damages."
Thus, if the original defendants were judgment-proof or if the mal-
practice plaintiff does not specifically plead that damages flowed
from the counselor's misfeasance, no recovery will result. In Chi-
cago Red Top Cab Association, Inc. v. Gaines,57 the court said:
A malpractice action by a client against his attorney is an action for damages
and has no basis unless the client has sustained a monetary loss as the result
53. 257 Wis. 25, 42 N.W.2d 155 (1950).
54. The underlying action in General Accident involved an automobile collision and
liability arising therefrom. The court was required to retry complex facts involving, inter
alia, contributory negligence. Id. at 28, 42 N.W.2d at 156.
55. Id.
56. Coggin, supra note 5, at 237.
57. 49 IlM. App. 3d 332, 364 N.E.2d 328 (1977).
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of some negligent act on the part of the lawyer.. . . In other words, negli-
gence even if proved is not actionable without resulting damage.58
If the plaintiff relies solely upon the lost opportunity to appeal
as the basis for an award of damages, his cause of action may like-
wise be dismissed. In CIM of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Wood,59 the
plaintiff contended that such damages were recoverable:
In effect, plaintiff urges that it is entitled to damages because of disappoint-
ment sustained by the loss of its right to appeal. This suit for malpractice
was submitted without testimony and... no testimony or other evidence
supporting this alleged element of damages appears in the record. Therefore
... we can make no such award."
Moreover, even if the plaintiff sues for return of the fees which he
advanced to his lawyer, that prayer may go unanswered because
the court could find that a "reasonable lawyer" would not have
appealed.'
II. EVIDENTIARY AND RELATED PROBLEMS IN FAILURE-TO-APPEAL
CASES
A. Disposition on Appeal: Question of Fact or Law?
Several questions arise concerning the nature of proof re-
quired to establish that the underlying action would have been re-
versed. Chief among them is whether the hypothetical decision of
the appellate court is an issue of fact or an issue of law. The an-
swer to this question determines whether a judge or a jury will de-
cide the issue of how the appellate court would have decided the
case.
In reference to Better Homes it has been argued that "[t]he
judge determined the client's likelihood of success upon a new trial
as a matter of law."6 2 This analysis of the Better Homes decision
fails to acknowledge the significance of the fact the judge hearing
the malpractice case was sitting without a jury; the court was com-
pelled to decide itself whether prejudicial error was present "be-
58. Id. at 333, 364 N.E.2d at 329.
59. 341 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
60. Id. at 1183.
61. See Kilmer v. Carter, 274 Cal. App. 2d 81, 78 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969). But see Welder
v. Mercer, 247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970) (attorney's gross dereliction of duty justified
return of fees).
62. See The Belated Appeal, supra note 28, at 142.
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low," and the absence of a jury precluded the question of disposi-
tion on appeal from becoming one of fact for the jury.6 3 Therefore
additional authority must be referred to in discussing this issue.
The California Court of Appeal, in Croce v. Sanchez,e4 held
that the question of success upon appeal was one of law. In af-
firming the trial judge's decision that no liability attached to the
counselor's failure to perfect an appeal, the court said, "[a]fter...
reading the reporter's transcript of the proceedings in Croce v.
Ryan [the underlying action], the trial judge determined as a mat-
ter of law that plaintiff's appeal, if perfected, would not have re-
sulted in a reversal of the judgment."6 5 According to the parties'
stipulation in Bryant v. Seagraves,6 what the appellate court
would have done with an appeal of the underlying action "[was] a
matter of law to be determined by the court and .. the court in
determination thereof may review the trial court file. . . .,8 In
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance, the court stated that
"[tihis [the fact that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of a
lost appeal] is obviously a question of law properly disposed of on
a motion for summary judgment."6 8 According to Mallen and
Levit,69 "[t]he initial determination, reserved solely for the court,
is whether the attorney erred. For example, only a judge can de-
cide whether an affidavit required for appeal was defective or if the
appeal would have been successful.
'70
One of the most thoroughly reasoned decisions to address the
question of fact versus law is Chocktoot v. Smith.7 1 Discussing this
issue in the context of alleged failure-to-appeal, 2 the Supreme
63. Although the presence or absence of a jury in a malpractice suit would not be deter-
minative of whether the question was a matter of fact or law, the threshold question of
submission to a jury cannot be answered here. In Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d
1255 (1977), the Supreme Court of Oregon, en banc, stated: "[w]e conclude, in short, that in
determining the probable consequences of an attorney's earlier negligence . . . the line di-
viding the responsibility of judge and jury runs between questions of law and questions of
fact." Id. at 574, 571 P.2d at 1259.
64. 256 Cal. App. 2d 680, 64 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1967).
65. Id. at 683, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (emphasis added).
66. 270 Or. 16, 526 P.2d 1027 (1974).
67. Id. at 18, 526 P.2d at 1028.
68. 257 Wis. at 26, 42 N.W.2d at 156.
69. R. MALLEN & V. LzvIT, supra note 1.
70. Id. at 345.
71. 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977).
72. Chocktoot also involved the issue of negligent trial preparation. This fact is signifi-
cant for the holding that disposition on appeal was a question of fact.
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Court of Oregon held, inter alia, that "[t]he legal consequences of
an atto. fey's failure ... to take an appeal are matters for argu-
ment, not proof,"173 implying that such a determination was one of
law, not fact. 4 The court ruled, however, that the disposition of an
underlying case on review was a matter of fact:
In the present case, the trial court, placing itself in the position of Judge
Sisemore in the earlier proceeding, concluded that proper presentation of all
. . . evidence would have led to a decision in favor of [the plaintiff], either at
trial or,. . . [upon] de novo review on appeal. That conclusion is one of fact
. . . and should have been left to the jury, unless [the evidence] called for a
directed verdict. . .. 75
In reversing the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court
held it error for the malpractice trial judge to determine as a mat-
ter of law what would have taken place with respect to the under-
lying action on appeal. Since this holding is in apparent contradic-
tion with those cited above, a closer analysis of the Chocktoot
decision is necessary.
In Chocktoot, allegations of negligence included failure to pre-
sent certain evidence to the original trial court.78 The plaintiff ar-
gued that the introduction of that evidence would have brought
about a different result either at trial or on appeal. The court hear-
ing the malpractice claim ruled that it was within the province of
the jury (in the malpractice case) to determine what should have
taken place if such evidence had been introduced, pointing out
that the effect of evidence upon a jury could be construed as an
issue of fact.77
To reconcile Chocktoot with earlier cases which held that dis-
73. 280 Or. at 573, 571 P.2d at 1258.
74. Indeed, the court made this explicit by stating that "[tihe same view [that the issue
was 'a matter of law to be decided by the court'] has been taken with respect to the proba-
ble success of an appeal." Id. at 574 n.4, 571 P.2d at 1258 n.4.
75. Id. at 575-76, 571 P.2d at 1259 (emphasis added).
76. The original action in Chocktoot was a will contest. In the malpractice suit, the
plaintiff maintained that if proof of his relationship to the testator had been submitted to
that surrogate's court, a portion of the estate would have been awarded to him. Id. at 569-
70, 571 P.2d at 1256.
77. A good portion of the rationale in Chocktoot involved drawing a distinction between
what would have happened as distinguished from what should have happened. The court
held that the former approach called for retroactive prediction of the probable behavior of
the trial court and was an unwieldy and speculative procedure. Instead, the court recom-
mended use of the "should" method, i.e., what should the lower court have done if the
lawyer performed like a reasonable attorney. See id. at 573, 571 P.2d at 1258.
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position on appeal was an issue of law, 8 it is essential to note first,
that although failure-to-appeal was a facet of the plaintiff's com-
plaint, it was by no means the actual gravamen.79 Secondly, the
argument that the underlying action would have been reversed
upon "de novo review on appeal" was relevant in particular to the
proceedings which constituted the underlying action in Chocktoot
(i.e., probate proceedings, the outcome of which depended upon
questions of fact).80 In addition, the court stated that "no jury can
reach its own judgment on the proper outcome of an earlier case
that hinged on an issue of law."'
Hence the Chocktoot decision, understood in light of its own
facts, fortifies the conclusion that when the probable outcome of a
lower court's decision rests upon an issue of law, the prediction of
that outcome in a malpractice action is itself a question of law to
be decided by the judge. While cases such as Better Homes had
assumed that issues on appeal would involve questions of law
(since appellate courts rarely decide or review issues of fact 2), the
78. See, e.g., Better Homes v. Rogers, 195 F. Supp. 93 (D.W. Va. 1961); Croce v.
Sanchez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 680, 64 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1967); Bryant v. Seagraves, 270 Or. 16, 526
P.2d 1027 (1974).
79. "[P]laintiff brought ... malpractice action ... alleging that they negligently had
failed to discover and present material evidence and to appeal the adverse decision in the
earlier case." Chocktoot, 280 Or. at 569, 571 P.2d at 1256. Saying this, the court then treated
the basis of the action as negligent trial litigation, suggesting that it was the non-submission
of evidence which constituted defendant's main breach of duty. Id. at 570, 571 P.2d at 1257.
80. Appeal from the lower court's decision would have provided the plaintiff in this
case an opportunity to raise certain issues of fact not presented before the trial court. See
id. at 570-71, 571 P.2d at 1256-57.
81. Id. at 572-73, 571 P.2d at 1258.
82. Although it may be generally true that appellate courts rarely decide or review
questions of fact (see 4 AM. JuR. 2D Appeal and Error § 76 (1962)), it is not strictly true and
hence this assertion requires some qualification. In New York, for example, the Appellate
Division courts are empowered to review both questions of law and questions of fact (see
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5501 (5)(c) (McKinney 1982)). The New York Court of Appeals re-
views questions of law only (N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAW § 5501 (5)(b) (McKinney 1982)) with the
exception that if an Appellate Division finds new facts and enters judgment thereon, the
court of appeals may review those facts (N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5501 (5)(b) (McKinney
1982)).
Moreover, cases such as Better Homes v. Rogers, 195 F. Supp. 93 (D.W. Va. 1961) (rever-
sal of jury verdict as a matter of law), Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963) (applica-
tion of legal principle ennunciated in decisional law to the facts of the ease), and Childs v.
Comstock, 69 A.D. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902) (construction of customs statute) all involved
legal issues which the malpractice plaintiff asserted would have been decided differently by
a court of appeal. That these were legal issues to be decided by judges and not juries, the
court in Chocktoot would hardly disagree. See infra text accompanying note 93.
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rationale in Chocktoot concerns the role of the jury in the mal-
practice case: if the outcome on appeal hinged upon an issue of
fact, then the jury must first decide what the outcome of that issue
would have been, before the judge can decide issues of law which
may have been presented on appeal. Maintaining this distinction
between the functions of judge and jury is important, for while one
may countenance the assumption of the appellate court's role by a
trial judge, any decision by a jury on an issue of law becomes more
repugnant by virtue of its de facto substitution as an appellate
court.
B. Expert Testimony
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact
is also significant because it determines the admissibility of certain
types of evidence:
The question of whether an attorney's malpractice is an issue of law or fact
has had a large impact on the admissibility of evidence establishing the stan-
dard of care. As noted earlier, if the court's interpretation of the question of
want of skill of an attorney is to be one of law, then expert witnesses could
not be used to testify that certain conduct of the attorney did or did not meet
the standard of prudence or diligence as established by the legal profession."
In the context of failure-to-appeal cases, however, it is not the
attorney's negligence per se which has been designated a question
of law, but rather the decision which the appellate court would
have reached upon review of the underlying action. It follows logi-
cally then that expert testimony in support or opposition to a de-
termination of how the appellate court would have decided a case
is inadmissible. Indeed, this is the position adopted by Breslin and
McMonigle: "[p]revailing on appeal is a legal question for the
court to decide. Thus, expert testimony is inadmissible on this is-
sue.'84 Criticizing Collins v. Wanner,5 the authors concluded that
admission of expert testimony on the issue of the settled state of
law affecting the underlying action Was "improper." '
In Chocktoot v. Smith the issue of expert testimony arose in
the context of distinguishing matters of fact from matters of law.
83. Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 5, at 127.
84. Id. at 126.
85. 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963).
86. Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 5, at 127.
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Suggesting that expert testimony would be inadmissible in regard
to questions of law,"' the court said that what would have hap-
pened in an earlier suit was one of "those consequences [which]
does not call for testimony by the judge ...whose hypothetical
rulings are to be retroactively 'predicted,' subject to cross-examina-
tion and confrontation with various precedents, nor does it call for
a battle of expert witnesses.. . ."Is While this statement is in ap-
parent consonance with the view expressed by Breslin and
McMonigle, the court in Chocktoot went on to say, "[o]f course the
parties may offer the court the views of experts on a legal issue if it
wishes them." 89 Although the admission of such evidence was held
reversible error in another case, 0 this statement has been inter-
preted to mean that attorneys for either side could submit memo-
randa on the legal issues affecting the underlying action.' 1
The rule that expert testimony is inadmissible for the pur-
poses of showing that an original action would have been modified
on appeal is defensible for several reasons. First of all, to allow
experts an opportunity to assert contradictory opinions about the
outcome of an appeal would unnecessarily duplicate the expertise
and arguments of the attorneys trying the malpractice case. With
each side foreseeably bringing forth its own witnesses to testify as
to what would have happened on appeal, the net probative value of
such evidence would be negligible.2 There is also the problem of
deciding who is a "specialist" qualified to predict the probable be-
havior of appellate courts. Would attorneys be qualified to render
such opinions? What of active or retired appellate justices? At-
tempting to distinguish the experts would fruitlessly embroil the
trial court in a debate over qualifications, as was pointed out in
Chocktoot v. Smith.93 Finally, the purpose to which experts are
usually put, clarifying matters not within the court's everyday ex-
perience, is not served in such circumstances because the judge is
87. "[T]he jury cannot decide a disputed issue of law on the testimony of lawyers."
Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. at 573, 571 P.2d at 1256.
88. Id. at 574, 571 P.2d at 1259 (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. See Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963).
91. D. MIsELmAN, supra note 1, at 257.
92. See Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 5, at 121, where the authors discuss "the
conclusiveness of expert testimony" remarking "[a]s long as there is a conflict in the ex-
perts' assumed facts, the jury has apparent discretion to reject all testimony."
93. 280 Or. at 573, 571 P.2d at 1256.
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arguably an "expert" himself who can answer questions of law
without such assistance; and the jury, whose limited role is to pre-
dict how another jury should have decided a case, could easily be
prejudiced by "experts" who in fact would be recommending to
them how to decide the case.
C. Admissibility of New Evidence in Failure-to-Appeal Cases
The question remains as to what type of evidence a court
hearing a malpractice claim of this type ought to allow to deter-
mine what would have occurred upon review. In CIM of Baton
Rouge, Inc. v. Wood, "the only evidence offered.., was the tran-
script of the original case. No testimony or other evidence support-
ing this alleged element of damages [loss of appeal] appears in the
record. Therefore . . . we can make no such award. '9 4 In Better
Homes, Inc. v. Rogers, "the record and transcript" of the underly-
ing action were submitted by stipulation,95 and in Bryant v. Sea-
graves, the court permitted review of all transcripts, exhibits, and
memoranda submitted between the parties in the underlying ac-
tion."' Indeed, a pattern appears among failure-to-appeal cases
which suggests that the only type of evidence which is admissible
constitutes that which was a part of the earlier adjudication.
When evidence other than the record or transcript of the un-
derlying action is required or permitted, there is a divergence of
opinion as to what form such evidence should take. In Childs v.
Comstock, the court permitted the plaintiff to cite appellate prece-
dents in support of his contention that the adverse judgment en-
tered below would have been reversed; it did not allow the defen-
dant to prove by way of actual administrative practice, not in the
record below, that the decision of the lower court would have been
affirmed.98
According to one writer, the, plaintiff in a malpractice suit al-
leging failure-to-appeal should be permitted to introduce new evi-
dence affecting the underlying action because such "a change in
94. 341 So. 2d at 1183.
95. 195 F. Supp. at 94.
96. 270 Or. at 118, 526 P.2d at 1028.
97. In Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963), the trial court admitted testimony
outside the record below, and it was reversed on appeal for this reason.
98. 69 A.D. at 167-68, 74 N.Y.S. at 648-49.
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evidence is permitted in a retrial."9 This statement uncritically as-
sumes that the jury in a malpractice case engages in an actual re-
trial of the underlying action and that admission of new evidence
would prejudice neither party. In fact, both these assumptions are
false.
1 00
In short, if a court hearing a malpractice claim is going to de-
termine what would have taken place on appeal, to be fair to the
defendant attorney it ought to do so on the basis of what the ap-
pellate court would have received and no more. Since the plaintiff's
contention is that the underlying case, as decided by the original
trial court, would have been reversed, it follows a fortiori that
other issues of fact or law should not be retroactively introduced.
Only when allegations of negligence include substandard trial tech-
nique should the question of "new" evidence or undecided issues
arise. 1
01
D. Failure-to-Appeal: The Difficult Cases
Problems surrounding failure-to-appeal litigation do not end
with resolution of the fact versus law controversy. Because proving
success on appeal has been so unsuccessful, 10 2 and because both
the substantive and procedural impediments to recovery are sub-
stantial, it can be argued that even the most straightforward of
cases' 03 defy a predictable outcome. If this is so, what then of more
complex cases where the issues in the underlying action can be
characterized as strictly "first impression?" How is a court to de-
cide, for example, a case in which an appeal was not proffered to
the court of last resort within a jurisdiction, although a court of
intermediate appeal had reviewed the case and handed down an
opinion? In such a circumstance, questions of fact and law con-
cerning the alleged negligence remain unchanged, but the added
99. See The Belated Appeal, supra note 28, at 144.
100. First, the trial within a trial which the malpractice court conducts is a fiction,
devoid of the formalities of a separate and distinct trial (e.g., opening statement, placement
on the trial calendar, jury charge, etc.). Second, the introduction of "fresh" evidence would
obviously be prejudicial to the defendant. It is in respect to the record below that the attor-
ney is held liable. Unless new evidence is excluded the attorney would be exposed to all
manner of claims based upon hindsight. See Coggin, supra note 5, at 232-37.
101. For example, see Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977).
102. See Welder v. Mercer, 247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970); Martin v. Burns, 102
Ariz. 341, 429 P.2d 660 (1967); Childs v. Comstock, 69 A.D. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902).
103. E.g., Better Homes v. Rogers, 195 F. Supp. 93 (D.W. Va. 1961).
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variable of a second judgment on the merits of the case is present.
A relevant inquiry becomes: should the second judgment cast a
heavier burden upon the malpractice plaintiff to show causation, or
upon the trial court to justify its review of what would then be a
higher court ruling?
Assume that the plaintiff in an underlying action sued the de-
fendant for breach of contract. The defendant brought a motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, which was denied
by the trial court. The defendant then appealed the denial of his
motion to an appellate court of competent jurisdiction which re-
versed the trial court and ordered dismissal. The plaintiff re-
quested his lawyer to appeal this decision to a higher appellate
court. Plaintiff's attorney negligently allowed the appeal to become
time-barred. What result?
In this example the plaintiff in a malpractice suit against his
lawyer could conceivably confront the defenses of res judicata,104
collateral estoppel,105 and stare decisis.10 6 In other words, the at-
torney could argue that since an appellate court had determined
that the plaintiff had no cause of action, any appeal would have
been fruitless. He or she might also assert that the trial court in
104. See Montrose v. Baggott, 161 A.D. 494, 146 N.Y.S. 649 (2d Dep't), appeal dis-
missed, 220 N.Y. 686, 116 N.E. 1062 (1914). In Montrose, the plaintiff asserted that the
judgment of the lower court was res judicata as between himself and the lawyer who repre-
sented him. The court said, "[wie do not agree with the plaintiffs that the defendants are
bound under the doctrine of res adjudicata [sic]. . . . Persons neither parties nor privies to
an action - and these defendants bore neither relation to the other actions - are not
estopped by a judgment." Id. at 501, 146 N.Y.S. at 654.
Indeed, one requirement of res judicata is being a party in interest to the earlier adjudi-
cation and this requirement could not be satisfied by an attorney who, although interested
in the outcome for the sake of his client, can neither be held liable for an adverse judgment,
nor demand the benefit of a favorable judgment from the court. See 9 N.Y. CARMODY WAITE
2d § 63:233 (R. Hursh ed. 1966):
The strict rule that a judgment is operative, under the doctrine of res judicata,
only in regard to parties and privies is sometimes expanded to include as parties
or privies a person who is not technically a party to a judgment, or in privity
with a party, but who is, nevertheless, connected with it through his interest in
the prior litigation and by his right to participate therein.
Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
105. Collateral estoppel presupposes both the requirements of res judicata, e.g., mutu-
ality of parties and identity of issues. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratory, Inc. v. University of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
106. "The rule of stare decisis is controlling when the court of last resort has laid down
a principle of law applicable to a certain state of fact[s] ... " Montrose v. Baggott, 161
A.D. at 501, 146 N.Y.S. at 654 (emphasis added).
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the malpractice suit is in no position to sit as arbiter of an appel-
late court's decision. If the underlying action has been reviewed by
a higher court, the law of the case would apparently preclude any
judgment from being entered by the malpractice court other than
that affirmed or reversed on appeal.
10 7
While the answers to these issues must await litigation,08 they
certainly emphasize the difficulties inherent in this area of profes-
sional liability litigation. On one hand it is difficult to disagree
with Judge Paul in Better Homes e" that attorneys should not en-
joy a privileged immunity from tort claims in connection with their
work. However, the court's position in Collins v. Wanner,110 that
an attorney should not be responsible for errors of judgment when
the law he or she is dealing with is unsettled, is also plausible. Be-
cause the nature of the failure-to-appeal case is - to a large extent
- predicated upon speculation, a certain amount of restraint is
appropriate. At the same time, when the attorney's failure to ap-
peal is the result of gross or admitted negligence, then the question
arises whether any substantive barriers should bar recovery.
III. SOME SOLUTIONS TO THE ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE DILEMMA
IN FAILURE-TO-APPEAL CASES
A. Leave to Appeal
One proposal which attempts to alleviate some of the
problems of proof confronting the failure-to-appeal plaintiff is that
the moving party be permitted to appeal even though review is
barred by the statute of limitations.1 1 According to this view, if
the plaintiff can show that the only reason procedural require-
ments were not met was due to his attorney's negligence then any
bar to appeal should be lifted. Not willing to accept the theory
that negligence of the attorney is negligence of the client, the au-
thor suggests that the agency analogy is unjust, because it fails to
take into account the fact that the attorney is an officer of the
107. Of course, the main issue is whether the attorney was negligent in failing to perfect
an appeal. To the extent that this issue has not been determined by any court, the effort to
employ the doctrine of stare decisis to bar adjudication must fail.
108. See Cohen v. Gross, Civil No. 79-H16742 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. filed July 9, 1979).
109. 195 F. Supp. at 96.
110. 382 P.2d at 109.




While this solution to the failure-to-appeal dilemma necessa-
rily eliminates the need to relitigate the underlying action or to
proceed against the erring attorney, it is for the most part unwork-
able. It suggests that the procedural and legal requirements con-
nected with bringing a suit can be dispensed with when extenuat-
ing circumstances are present.113 This leads to the question: if an
attorney fails to commence a suit within the statute of limitations,
should the client be allowed to bring a suit against the defendant
anyway, under the theory that the lawyer was at fault, and not the
client? A policy of this sort would create a host of problems, in-
cluding proliferation of litigation, exposure of would-be defendants
to aged claims, and collusive agreements between attorneys and
their clients who face procedural impediments.
B. Insurance
Another possible remedy for the failure-to-appeal victim is the
"client security fund."11" Discussed in the context of attorney mis-
feasance in general, and actually operative in many states," 5 these
funds are meant to compensate those whose rights and property
are injured by the acts of their attorneys. Such a fund has been
justified in the following way:
The basic argument in favor of the establishment of a clients' security fund is
premised upon the bar's moral duty to the public as honorable, learned, and
skilled; when this trust is betrayed, the profession as a whole has a duty to
rectify the wrong committed against a client. The client has relied upon the
profession's collective representation. Consequently, the profession has an
interest in every breach of that representation.11
However, client security funds will not normally recompense the
victims of failure-to-appeal malpractice."17 Their purpose is to re-
imburse clients whose attorneys have fraudulently converted or
112. Id. at 156.
113. See The Belated Appeal, supra note 28, at 152 n.67, where the authors cite vari-
ous relief statutes where remission from appellate deadlines can be granted - in rare in-
stances. See, e.g., In re Loewenbach's Will, 210 Wis. 253, 246 N.W. 332 (1933).
114. Note, The Disenchanted Client v. The Dishonest Lawyer: Where Does The Legal
Profession Stand?, 42 NoTm DAME LAW. 383, 384 (1967).
115. Id. The Note mentions 28 states, including New York and Illinois.
116. Id. at 384-85 (emphasis added).
117. "Malpractice or disputes over fees are not within the purview of clients' security




Another type of fund, known as the "Professional Liability
Fund," 118 would serve to compensate clients of lawyers who breach
their professional duties by negligent acts and omissions. In dis-
cussing this type of fund it has been noted that:
A professional liability fund would not only protect the thousands of clients
who now, practically speaking, have no present remedy against execution-
proof lawyers for their injury, but it would also benefit the profession. It has
been estimated that such a plan would provide savings of thirty-five to fifty
percent over comparative private insurance." '
The professional liability fund would act much like a private insur-
ance carrier in that it would defend the attorney in the malpractice
action and pay claims in the form of court-mandated judgments. 120
The major difference would be that contribution to the profes-
sional liability fund would be mandatory.121 In short, a liability
fund of this type would amount to compulsory malpractice insur-
ance carried by the state or district bar association.
Although the establishment of such a fund would undoubtedly
increase goodwill between the public and the legal profession, and
might result in monetary savings for participating lawyers, it is not
clear how effectively it would prevent the often harsh results of
failure-to-appeal malpractice. In order for a client to recover from
such a fund, his attorney would first have to be found liable by a
court. Hence, the client's burden of proof is in no way lightened,
and there is no suggestion that the fund would adopt a "charita-
ble" view of the frustrated client who could not establish liability
through bringing a malpractice action. 22 Indeed, viewed from the
perspective of the malpractice victim, the fund would defend the
negligent lawyer in the malpractice suit, and would be a real bene-
118. See Boyer & Conner, Legal Malpractice and Compulsory Client Protection, 29
HAsTiNGs L.J. 835, 840 (1978).
119. Id. at 840.
120. "These pooled funds would be administered much like a claims-made liability in-
surance plan. The administrators of this public corporation would defend the attorney ac-
cused of malpractice and pay an adverse judgment up to specified limits." Id. at 835-36.
121. See id. at 839, where the authors discuss the insurance industry's reluctance to
participate in such schemes and successful challenges to compelled participation. See also
id. at 845, where failure by attorneys to avoid mandatory participation programs is
discussed.
122. The one real advantage of the client security fund lies in the fact that a successful




fit only in those rare cases where liability was established but the
lawyer was judgment-proof.
C. Res Ipsa Loquitor
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor has also been mentioned in
reference to legal malpractice,2 3 and must be considered as a pos-
sible solution to the problems connected with proving success on
appeal where the attorney's negligence is admitted.12 4 In these
cases the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could help reduce the plain-
tiff's burden of proof.
Plaintiffs have attempted to utilize the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove
a prima facie case of legal malpractice. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur af-
fects the burden of producing evidence. It requires the plaintiff to prove that
the injury (1) must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the ab-
sence of someone's negligence, and (2) must be caused by an agent or instru-
mentality in the control of the defendant."' 5
While the failure-to-appeal malpractice complaint could con-
form to ,the above-stated requirements of the res ipsa doctrine, 26
it is unlikely that the main hurdle in such cases (i.e., proving an
appeal would have been successful) would be eliminated or even
reduced by applying the doctrine. Although it might improve a
plaintiff's chances of establishing negligence per se, the question of
causation would still loom over the litigation. Even in cases where
the trial court was clear in its decision concerning the underlying
action (suggesting that the only impediment to reversal on appeal
was non-conformance with procedural rules), it would be difficult
for any court to apply res ipsa loquitor in light of the presumption
123. See Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 5, at 121.
124. See, e.g., Better Homes v. Rogers, 195 F. Supp. 93 (D.W. Va. 1961); Collins v.
Wanner, 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963); Bryant v. Seagraves, 270 Or. 16, 526 P.2d 1027 (1974);
Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968).
125. Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 5, at 121.
126. It has been argued that the plaintiff in an appeal dismissed for being untimely was
contributorily negligent. See Franke v. Zimmerman, 526 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)
(attorneys alleged that their client failed to pay for the printing of the record on appeal).
When appellate pleadings are at the printers (as they were in Franke) and represent the last
step in perfecting an appeal, does the attorney have a duty to subsidize their completion? It
is submitted that if the costs do not amount to a great expense and if the client has not
expressly asked that an appeal be dropped, then the lawyer has a duty to preserve the right
to appeal. Since legal strategy and its effectuation are entrusted to the lawyers, the second
element of res ipsa loquitor would point to liability of the lawyer.
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of validity which attaches to unappealed lower court decisions. 127
D. Punitive Damages
Another possible answer to the difficulties associated with fail-
ure-to-appeal malpractice lies in awarding punitive damages to ag-
grieved clients. By finding the attorney liable for judgment in the
amount of the legal fees advanced to proffer the appeal, 128 the
award of punitive damages would serve to compensate the plaintiff
who could not prove that an appeal would have been successful.
Such an award would also encourage maintenance of a high level of
professionalism within the legal community because of its deter-
rent effect.
A practical difficulty with this approach lies in determining
the amount of damages. What is a lost appeal worth? If courts are
unwilling to award damages for psychological pain and suffering, 2 "
the "harm" of disappointment over losing an opportunity to ap-
peal will not be compensated in such cases. Therefore, the grounds
for awarding punitive damages must be based upon other
authority.
13 0
E. Shifting the Burden of Persuasion
Perhaps the most reasoned approach to the problems of proof
and damages in failure-to-appeal cases is to adopt a decidedly lib-
eral attitude towards the degree of proof required to show that the
client has been substantially harmed as a result of the attorney's
negligence. Such a relaxation of the standards of pleading and
proof has occurred in some instances.131 In cases where the under-
127. "It was made to appear that a trial was had in the court below upon the merits,
and a decree rendered against the plaintiffs. Prima facie this decree was right .... The
presumption of its validity would not have been overcome by showing the amount involved
in the case." Cornelissen v. Ort, 132 Mich. at 299, 93 N.W. at 619.
128. See Welder v. Mercer, 247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970); Pete v. Henderson,
124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954).
129. See Vitale v. Coyne Realty, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 562, 414 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1979).
130. One authority might be the decisional law in another area of professional negli-
gence, i.e., medical malpractice. But c.f. STETaM & Monrrz, DocToR AND PATImNT AND THE
LAW 431 (1962) ("[a]wards of punitive or exemplary damages are not frequent in suits
against physicians"). Moreover, punitive damages presuppose intentional wrongdoing. See
Cohen v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 65 A.D.2d 71, 410 N.Y.S.2d 597 (lst
Dep't 1978).
131. See, e.g., Richardson v. King, 36 A.D.2d 781, 319 N.Y.S.2d 218 (3d Dep't 1971)
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lying action is one of first impression, or where the questions
presented to the court are highly controversial, the law should be
changed to create a presumption in favor of the disappointed
client.
In effect the court would assume that the plaintiff would have
prevailed on appeal, absent clear and convincing proof to the con-
trary. The burden of persuasion would then shift to the defendant.
To meet this burden of proof in the context of unsettled case law
or in a case of first impression would be virtually impossible. In
circumstances such as those found in Collins v. Wanner1 3 2 the mal-
practice plaintiff would prevail because there would be no basis for
the lawyer to assert that the trial judgment would have been
affirmed.
Shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant-attorney
would result in no real hardship or injustice, because unlike impo-
sition of a strict liability rule, the opportunity to discharge the
burden would not be denied. Moreover, such a procedure would
preclude any lawyer, who had impliedly or expressly warranted
that an appellate adjudication of the underlying action would have
been favorable, from later maintaining that the appeal was without
merit. On estoppel grounds alone a shift towards greater liability
would be justified. And, unable to avail themselves of the "fruitless
appeal" defense, members of the legal profession would be en-
couraged to adopt habits, procedures, and safeguards which would
eliminate or at least decrease the incidence of negligence in con-
nection with the successful filing and perfecting of an appeal.
CONCLUSION
Despite the evident difficulties involved in failure-to-appeal
malpractice cases, there is no suggestion that they defy a reasoned
outcome. By employing the so-called "Winter Doctrine" 3 and
drawing authority from decided cases, a trial court deciding an ap-
peal malpractice case should display little hesitancy in making its
(plaintiff resisted dismissal for failure to allege that but for the attorney's negligence, she
would have prevailed). See also D. MmsELmAN, supra note 1, at § 3:8 (author discusses the
so-called "Winter Doctrine" which shifts the burden to the defendant). See also Winter v.
Brown, 365 A.2d 381, 385 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976) ("[The defendants] must bear the onus of
their error and the resultant impossibility of ascertaining the value of what was lost.").
132. 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963).




Outside the courtroom context, however, questions concerning
this area of the law remain unanswered. These include whether
there exists an implied duty on the part of an attorney to make the
client's case ready for appeal, even at his own expense, whether a
lawyer can be held liable for not fully understanding a highly un-
settled area of law, and whether an attorney's judgment concerning
the wisdom of taking an appeal ought to be second-guessed.
While these and a host of other inquiries must await intelli-
gent review, a caveat regarding the latter issue is appropriate. Not
all lawyers share the same training and experience, and clients
must be aware that the selection process in finding an attorney
often results in a seasoned and experienced advocate being pitted
against one not so skilled. So long as the latter possesses the mini-
mum qualifications to practice law, however, losing one lawsuit
should not be the impetus for starting another. Especially in the
area of appeals practice, where the lawyer's judgment plays a large
role, caution is advisable. While one may never excuse missing an
appeal's filing deadline, the adversarial system of law and adjudi-
cation in appellate practice necessarily results in a loss for one of
the parties. With clients and their attorneys aware of these facts,
the kind of full disclosure and alternative decision making they
should generate will serve to reduce the incidence of malpractice of
all kinds.
JUSTIN STILLWELL WHITE
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